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             Knowing their loves: knowledge, ignorance, and blindness in 
                                           ’Tis Pity She’s a Whore 
 
Ever since Brian Morris remarked in his introduction to the New Mermaids edition of 
’Tis Pity She’s a Whore that „the word “blood”...occurs more than thirty times in the 
course of the play‟,1 critical attention has been paid to Ford‟s complex uses of the 
term.
2
  In terms of sheer frequency, however, there is another word which figures far 
more prominently than „blood‟ in the play, yet which has received much less sustained 
examination, and that is the verb „know‟ and its related forms.3  „Know‟ itself occurs 
seventy-six times, „knowledge‟ three, „know‟t‟ six, „known‟ four, „knows‟ three, 
„knew‟ five, and „know‟st‟ four, giving a total of a hundred and two instances.  Such 
frequency of use should certainly alert us to the fact that knowledge, and indeed 
epistemology itself, as well as their literal and metaphorical corollaries blindness and 
ignorance, form an important part of the play‟s thematic structure.  Moreover, 
„knowing‟ words are, as one might expect, not distributed uniformly through the text; 
they cluster around particular issues, and, very strikingly, demarcate the speech- and 
thought-patterns of particular characters, most especially Vasques and the Friar.  To 
use John S. Wilks‟s term for Doctor Faustus and The Atheist’s Tragedy, plays with 
which ’Tis Pity shares interests in incest and in atheism, this is „a tragedy of 
knowledge‟,4 whose incestuous love-story proves a site for the exploration of some of 
the key discourses of Renaissance knowledges and their demarcations.  As Bruce 
Boehrer argues, „Ford drew the intellectual conflict of ’Tis Pity from the very issues 
2 
that were beginning to distinguish modern European society from its medieval 
origins‟.5     
i) Knowing love 
 
One repeated feature of Ford‟s use of „knowing‟ words is, as so often in Renaissance 
drama, a sustained pun on the idea of „carnal knowledge‟.  The play very obviously 
derives much of its source material from a reworking of Romeo and Juliet,
6
 but there 
is a striking difference in the presentation of the two main characters and those who 
surround them: instead of a nurse, a figure who serves overtly to link Juliet with the 
childhood comforts she leaves behind during the course of her story, Annabella is 
attended by a „tut‟ress‟.  The female servant whose role is explicitly referred to as an 
educational one is surely a rare phenomenon in Renaissance drama - I can think of no 
other example - and serves further to underline the idea of the importance and 
imparting of knowledge.  Ironically, however, this particular „tut‟ress‟, ominously 
named Putana, proves disconcertingly like Juliet‟s nurse in her farmyard morality: 
what she teaches Annabella is nothing more than a radically debased view of human 
sexuality.  Her eventual punishment for this is a fitting one: like Oedipus and like 
Gloucester, she pays the price for her sexual sin by forfeiting her eyes.  „Knowing‟ 
what one should not is rewarded by a blindness which, in Putana‟s case, proves to be a 
literal, not a redemptive one - no „cloud of unknowing‟ but a state of terrifying 
vulnerability and disempowerment in which she can be led unresisting to her death. 
 
3 
The specifically sexual nature of her knowledge is amply illustrated.  In her summing 
up of Annabella‟s suitors, she describes Soranzo as „liberal, that I know; loving, that 
you know‟ (I.ii.91-2), which directly links knowledge both with felt experience and, 
explicitly, with love.  Moreover, unlike Juliet‟s nurse, Putana is never said to have had 
a husband and child of her own, yet she can demand indignantly of Giovanni, „How 
do I know‟t?  Am I at these years ignorant what the meanings of qualms and water-
pangs be?‟ (III.iii.10-11).7  And she is finally indicted by her own half-boast to 
Vasques, „I know a little, Vasques‟ (IV.iii.195), in a context charged with knowing 
sexuality not only by the explicit fact that it is the father of Annabella‟s child who is 
under discussion but by the possibility of an all / awl pun in Vasques‟, „Well, I could 
wish she would in plain terms tell all‟ (IV.iii.188-9).   
 
Other characters also make the link between loving and knowing.  Giovanni does so 
repeatedly.  Of his eight uses of „know‟, one of „knew‟, four of „know‟t‟ and two of 
„know‟st‟ (giving an overall total of fifteen), several hover around the love / 
knowledge pun.  „‟Tis not, I know, / My lust, but ‟tis my fate that leads me on‟, he 
says at I.ii.153-4.  The statement is in various ways a highly dubious one.  Giovanni is 
always anxious to allocate responsibility for his own actions to fate; here his rationale 
seems especially suspect, since our awareness of the habitual secondary meaning of 
the word „know‟ serves merely to reinforce the suggestion of lust.  Later, when 
Annabella, showing him the jewel given her by Donado and playfully terming its 
donor „a lusty youth‟ (II.vi.127), asks him if he is jealous, he replies: 
          That you shall know anon, at better leisure. 
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          Welcome, sweet night!  The evening crowns the day. 
                                                              (II.vi.131-2) 
The evening crowns the day, presumably, because it brings with it the promise of 
sexual activity, which is what will make the night sweet; what Annabella will know, 
then, is carnal knowledge. 
 
The same idea recurs when Giovanni is reproaching her for her altered attitude in V, 
v: 
          What, changed so soon?  Hath your new sprightly lord 
          Found out a trick in night-games more than we 
          Could know in our simplicity? 
                                                   (V.v.1-3) 
It even colours his passionate defence of their actions: 
                      If ever after-times should hear 
         Of our fast-knit affections, though perhaps 
         The laws of conscience and of civil use 
          May justly blame us, yet when they but know 
          Our loves, that love will wipe away that rigour 
          Which would in other incests be abhorred. 
                                                         (V.v.68-73) 
But others can of course precisely not „know‟ the love of Giovanni and Annabella in 
the sense in which he customarily employs the word; such knowledge can only be 
directly experiential, not vicarious.  The terms on which Giovanni has previously 
predicated the acquisition of knowledge must make it for ever incommunicable. 
5 
 
 A literal inability to communicate marks his penultimate use of the word 
„know‟: 
          Yes, father; and that times to come may know 
          How as my fate I honoured my revenge, 
          List, father, to your ears I will yield up 
          How much I have deserved to be your son. 
                                                     (V.vi.36-9) 
What does this mean?  The abstract nouns „fate‟ and „revenge‟ serve, as so often in 
Ford,
8
 to dissipate the sense of direct and unambiguous meaning, nor is the tone clear: 
what effect does Giovanni intend to produce upon his father by ascribing his horrific 
actions to „how much I have deserved to be your son‟?  It is at least arguable that 
Giovanni is in fact mad here - functioning under the clearly mistaken belief that it is 
possible to identify a person by their heart, and using words and phrases in a similarly 
idiosyncratic and ideolectal manner.
9
  His final use of the word „know‟ certainly 
reveals an odd kind of logic: 
          For nine months‟ space in secret I enjoyed 
          Sweet Annabella‟s sheets; nine months I lived 
          A happy monarch of her heart and her. 
          Soranzo, thou know‟st this; thy paler cheek 
          Bears the confounding print of thy disgrace, 
          For her too fruitful womb too soon bewrayed 
          The happy passage of our stol‟n delights, 
          And made her mother to a child unborn. 
6 
                                                  (V.vi.44-51) 
Soranzo‟s knowledge here is, once again, envisaged as having an essentially physical 
basis.  Manifesting itself in the bodily sign of the pale cheek, what he „knows‟ seems 
to be profoundly connected with what is „bewrayed‟ by Annabella‟s womb, which 
Giovanni has himself so recently „ploughed up‟ (V.vi.32).  His own need to uncover 
its secrets by direct contact with it raises the whole issue of what Luke Wilson has 
called „the problem of knowledge about the inside of the body‟,10 and a more rarely 
dissected female body at that: Jonathan Sawday has observed that „[t]he womb or 
uterus was an object sought after with an almost ferocious intensity in Renaissance 
anatomy theatres.
11
  This may well be seen as lending a similarly experiential 
colouring to his use of „know‟ here, as it perhaps did to his earlier demand to Putana, 
„With child?  How dost thou know‟t?‟ (III.iii.9); Giovanni in his quest for knowledge 
will violate not only the traditionally female, private space of the birth chamber,
12
 but 
the secrets of the womb itself, making of himself „a tragicall midwife‟.13  His act 
echoes and ironically inverts our first glimpse of Hippolita, who enters, as Nathaniel 
Strout points out, „having forced her way into her lover Soranzo‟s private room‟;14 
both stand as desperate efforts to know what is hidden inside, and indeed William 
Dyer refers to Giovanni‟s treatment of his sister as „his nine-month pursuit of 
interiority.‟15  Both violations of space may, moreover, remind us that Ford had both 
family and literary links to the history of St Carlo Borromeo,
16
 whose invention of the 
confession box, apparently intended originally only for women, can be argued to have 
performed an analogous function of serving to demarcate sexual knowledge as an area 
of investigation.
17
     
 
 
7 
ii) Knowing God 
 
Giovanni presents himself as absolutely confident of his own knowledge, rooted as it 
is in his physical experiences.  An impression of far less certainty is conveyed by the 
Friar‟s very different pattern of usage of words denoting knowledge, which indeed 
brings him very much into line with what John Wilks has called the „epistemological 
uncertainty‟ of Ford‟s own non-dramatic writing.18  The Friar is responsible for two of 
the three uses of the word „knowledge‟ in the play (and also, at I.i.75, for an 
occurrence of its near homonym „acknowledge‟).  To him - appropriately given his 
recent position at Bologna - knowledge appears to be an absolute, unquestionable 
good; and yet his actual use of the words „know‟ and „knowledge‟ often works to 
undercut the very certainties he apparently articulates.  His first use of „knowledge‟ 
has him crying: 
          O Giovanni, hast thou left the schools 
          Of knowledge to converse with lust and death? 
                                                            (I.i.57-8) 
Here the proximity of „knowledge‟ to „lust‟ threatens to pull the word in precisely the 
direction so markedly favoured by Giovanni, tending to merge the two rather than 
sustaining the opposition ostensibly created between them.  His second use of the 
word destabilises it even further, as he stigmatises Giovanni‟s reasoning as „O 
ignorance in knowledge‟ (II.v.27).  Here knowledge is not an absolute at all, but 
something that can, with alarming rapidity, be seen to contain its own opposite.
19
 
 
 
8 
Even more striking is the fact that during the entire scene in which the Friar convinces 
Annabella to marry Soranzo he uses the word „know‟ only once, and then in relation 
not to the heavenly things of which he is presumed to have special knowledge, but, 
with apparent perversity, in relation to the secular: 
          Sigh not; I know the baits of sin 
          Are hard to leave.  O, ‟tis a death to do‟t. 
                                              (III.vi.39-40) 
When it comes to hell and heaven, he claims no knowledge; when it comes to „the 
baits of sin‟ from which he seeks to dissuade her, he does.  The Friar is in fact 
remarkably reluctant to claim knowledge in his own sphere,  and Ford, whatever the 
precise nature of his involvement with the law may have been,
20
 will certainly have 
been well aware of the important legal distinction between what is within one‟s own 
personal knowledge and what is merely hearsay.
21
  The Friar uses „know‟ only three 
times in the play, „knowledge‟ twice, and „known‟ once.  Moreover, two of these uses 
are actually within the specific context  of denying or refusing knowledge: 
                                     I must not stay 
          To know thy fall; back to Bononia I 
          With speed will haste, and shun this coming blow. 
          Parma, farewell; would I had never known thee, 
          Or aught of thine. 
                                                   (V.iii.65-9) 
This reluctance to know is prefigured in his opening speech: 
          Dispute no more in this, for know, young man, 
          These are no school-points; nice philosophy 
          May tolerate unlikely arguments, 
9 
          But Heaven admits no jest: wits that presumed 
          On wit too much, by striving how to prove 
          There was no God, with foolish grounds of art, 
          Discovered first the nearest way to hell, 
          And filled the world with devilish atheism. 
          Such questions, youth, are fond; for better ‟tis 
          To bless the sun than reason why it shines; 
          Yet He thou talk‟st of is above the sun. 
          No more; I may not hear it. 
                                         (I.i.1-12) 
For all the Friar‟s status as educator, the entire speech is imbued with an aesthetic and 
indeed an ethic of ignorance; all that can be known is that it is better not to know, and 
beyond this it is better not to hear, and the whole is reinforced by the condescension of 
the „young man‟ which disables Giovanni‟s entire perspective by suggesting 
accumulated (although presumably strictly circumscribed) experience rather than 
ratiocination as the appropriate basis for knowledge.  It is of course ironic that the 
speech‟s obvious allusion to Marlowe, most famous of the „wits who presumed‟,22 
issues the audience with an appeal to their own knowledge, to be used in spotting and 
applying the reference.  To have the Friar by definition deaf to this metatheatrical 
level on which his words operate underlines his willed blindness; at the same time, 
however, the choice of the verb „discovered‟, with its suggestion of inappropriate 
revelation, may prompt us towards an application of the Marlowe story which would 
at least in part endorse the Friar‟s perspective on it. 
 
 
10 
A similar desire not to know powers the Friar‟s admonition to Giovanni in II,v: 
          Peace.  Thou hast told a tale, whose every word 
          Threatens eternal slaughter to the soul. 
          I‟m sorry I have heard it; would mine ears 
          Had been one minute deaf, before the hour 
          That thou cam‟st to me. 
                                               (II.v.1-5) 
Here it is not only Giovanni‟s actual deeds but his very words which are seen as 
having the power to defile, and the Friar ends his gesture of recoil by a wish for 
deafness which provides a clear counterpart to the literal blindness eventually inflicted 
on his educative counterpart, Putana.  It is gloriously ironic that one of the very few 
occasions on which the Friar does assume knowledge and pronounce with certainty 
should be such a ludicrous one: he pontificates that „that marriage seldom‟s good, / 
Where the bride-banquet so begins in blood‟ (IV.i.109-110), asserting a wide 
experience of bloody bride-banquets which neither he nor very many other people can 
seriously be expected to possess. 
 
Ironically, Friar Bonaventura‟s name echoes that of the famous Franciscan author of 
the Lignum Vitae, and thus works to associate him with the pronounced Franciscan 
interest in epistemology: „at its origins, the Franciscan movement had what we might 
now consider a revolutionary character, and revolutions produce changes in 
knowledge and in thought, notably about the nature of human relations and about the 
determining conditions of human life‟.23  The possibility of a deliberate allusion here 
is enhanced by the fact that in Whetstone‟s An Heptameron of Civill Discourses a 
Monsieur Bergetto reports a tale set „[i]n a little village among the Apennine 
11 
mountaines, not far from the place where S. Fraunces lieth intombed‟ (Whetstone also 
features a character called Soranso).
24
  Faustus, transgressing in ways notably similar 
to the modes of Giovanni‟s rebellion, had specifically requested that Mephostophilis 
should appear in the robes of a Franciscan friar; perhaps, if the stage image of 
Giovanni with Bonaventure may recall that of Faustus and Mephostophilis, the cagey 
nature of Bonaventure‟s proselytising may similarly echo Mephostophilis‟ question-
begging, niggardly imparting of information on things celestial.  Both, however, stand 
in sharp contrast to the questioning spirit of Franciscan thought, and both, too, insert 
into their respective plays a reminder of the anti-materialist commitment of the 
Franciscans which sharply critiques the worldly values which so many of the 
characters espouse.  Moreover, an allusion to Bonaventure becomes a particularly 
pointed one in a play about incest, since his model of a harmonious relationship 
between God and the soul was one which a recent critic has termed „spritually 
incestuous‟.25  
 
 
There is also a striking contrast between the Friar‟s own reticence about his authority 
and the evidence for popular belief which we see in the play.  When he expounds his 
vision of hell to Annabella, he prefaces it with the injunction, „weep faster yet, / 
Whiles I do read a lecture‟ (III.vi.5-6).  To call it a „lecture‟ which he reads 
deliberately situates it within the realm of human knowledge, something which is 
underlined by the existence of copious literary antecedents for the picture he paints.  
Giovanni adopts exactly the same position when he speculates on the after-life: „The 
schoolmen teach that all this globe of earth / Shall be consumed to ashes in a minute‟ 
(V.v.30-1).  Annabella, however, has no such qualms about authority: she replies to 
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her brother‟s questions with „That‟s most certain‟ (V.v.35),  and „For certain‟ 
(V.v.38).  The lack of experiential basis for her claim to knowledge seems sharply 
underlined when she eventually acknowledges that she has reached its limits:
26
 
          GIOVANNI                          But d‟ee think 
                               That I shall see you there? - You look on me? 
                               May we kiss one another, prate or laugh, 
                               Or do as we do here? 
          ANNABELLA                                 I know not that. 
                                                                      (V.v.38-41) 
Here „know‟ seems once again to flirt with its habitual sexual meaning; Annabella 
disclaims knowledge of kissing or laughing not only in the abstract but, presumably, 
in the present, because the entire scene seems to be unfolding in the aftermath of her 
implied refusal to resume sexual relations with her brother.  For all that they enter 
„lying on a bed‟ (V.v.s.d.), Giovanni‟s opening accusation „What, changed so soon?‟ 
(V.v.1) appears to leave little doubt that relations between them have dramatically 
altered.  The resulting emotional dynamic charges the whole scene with a particularly 
forceful sense of the connections between „knowing‟ and carnally knowing.  
 
 
As in this scene, Annabella is generally characterised by a remarkable confidence in 
her own knowledge, and her uses of the word tend to be tellingly nuanced by ideas of 
faith and belief.  There is a suggestive exchange with Soranzo which plays with 
precisely such ideas: 
SORANZO                            Do you not know 
                     What I should tell you? 
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ANNABELLA                                Yes, you‟ll say you love me. 
SORANZO  And I‟ll swear it, too; will you believe it? 
ANNABELLA  ‟Tis no point of faith. 
                                                 (III.ii.15-18) 
When Giovanni, about to broach his passion to her, says „I think you love me, sister‟ 
(I.ii.182), she replies unhesitatingly, „Yes, you know I do‟ (I.ii.183), and Giovanni 
concedes „I know‟t indeed‟ (I.ii.184).  Annabella can feel sure even of what other 
people know; she disables Giovanni‟s claim to „thought‟ by the counter-assertion that 
the idea of her love is not a product of his own ratiocination but a pre-existing 
absolute to which he merely has access.  A similar distinction underlines her notable 
defiance of Soranzo, which tellingly reprises and inverts their earlier exchange: 
          ANNABELLA                  Alas, alas, there‟s all. 
                                   Will you believe? 
          SORANZO                               What? 
          ANNABELLA                                    You shall never know. 
                                                                              (IV.iii.50-1) 
Immediately before this Annabella has announced to her husband that „This noble 
creature was in every part / So angel-like, so glorious‟ (IV.iii.36-7), and taunted him: 
          Let it suffice that you shall have the glory 
          To father what so brave a father got. 
                                                     (IV.iii.44-5) 
The idea of „glory‟, the suggestion that there is merit attached merely to being  
perceived as the father of this mysteriously-begotten infant, and above all the resonant 
appellation of „angel‟ all serve to invest the scene with parodic echoes of the 
traditional Mystery Play revelation of the divine responsibility for the pre-marital 
14 
pregnancy of Mary and the unworthy nature of Joseph‟s suspicions;27 and the idea is 
reinforced when Annabella sings „Morendo in gratia Dei, morirei senza dolore‟ 
(IV.iii.63). 
 
 
 In such a context Annabella‟s juggling of the twin poles of knowledge and 
belief becomes doubly charged.  What she actually says is ambivalent in its meaning.  
Soranzo‟s „What?‟ interrupts the syntax of her sentence and makes it ultimately 
unclear whether the verb „believe‟ is to be taken as transitive or intransitive.  
Soranzo‟s „What?‟ could be a completely literal one, requesting clarification of the 
object of „believe‟, and this could be precisely what he is offered in the second half of 
the sentence: Annabella wants him to believe that he will never know, i.e. to accept 
that his hounding of her is futile since she will never tell him the name of her child‟s 
father.  Equally, though, the sentence seems to set up a powerful opposition between 
knowing and believing which makes one more than merely the object of the other, and 
this takes on a particular force if it is read within the template of Annabella as an 
analogue of Mary, possessed of special, divinely imparted knowledge, and Soranzo as 
the igorant Joseph from whom an act of faith is required.  With her customary 
certainty, Annabella denies absolutely the possibility of Soranzo ever possessing her 
own knowledge, but she does offer him the alternative position of belief - the same 
sort of belief that will later characterise her own attitude in her exchange with 
Giovanni about the afterlife.  What would remain unclear in this second reading is 
what Soranzo is invited to believe, unless he is being recommended to the blindest of 
faiths.  Earlier, Annabella has told him, with a strange mixture of insult and seeming 
ingenuousness, „Would you be patient yet, and hide your shame, / I‟d see whether I 
15 
could love you‟ (IV.iii.24-5); she could be seen as extending a similar sort of 
invitation here, offering fidelity in exchange for faith.  Alternatively, the religious 
connotations of the preceding section of the dialogue might spill over to invite a 
Christian approach of forgiveness from Soranzo, though either of these interpretations 
might well seem subject to the charge of strain.  Ultimately, the only person who can 
ever be fully confident of Annabella‟s meaning is herself, since she seems to be 
guided throughout by an absolute confidence in her own ability to control the 
hermeneutics of her pregnancy.
28
   To this extent, at least, the Friar‟s distrust of 
knowledge seems justified, since Annabella, who has had so much less formal 
education than her brother, has so markedly greater a spiritual certainty than he. 
 
iii) Knowing the World 
 
Another character who displays a high level of confidence in his own knowledge is 
Vasques.  Indeed, in terms of the depiction of knowledge and igorance, Vasques and 
the Friar emerge as the structural poles of the play, situated at precisely opposite 
extremes.  Whereas the Friar, an ostensible authority-figure, utters only six of the 
play‟s one hundred and two uses of „know‟ and its derivatives, Vasques is responsible 
for twenty-three.  Admittedly, he has a larger part: of the play‟s total of 2,281 lines, 
Vasques speaks 296 and the Friar 181 (figures which are complicated by the fact that 
all Vasques‟ lines are in prose, and may therefore be either significantly longer or 
significantly shorter than an iambic pentameter, and all the Friar‟s in verse).  
Nevertheless, the discrepancy seems to me striking, and it may well be taken as telling 
that the society of Parma is one in which a Spanish servant feels more 
16 
epistemologically secure than an honoured representative of the state-sponsored 
religious system. 
 
 Unburdened by worries about the status of knowledge, Vasques is far more 
concerned with its functions.  When he is speaking to Putana, he represents 
knowledge not as an absolute, but as a transitory object of gratification: 
          I durst be sworn, all his madness is for that she will not confess whose ‟tis, 
          which he will know, and when he doth know it, I am so well acquainted with 
          his humour, that he will forget all straight.  Well, I could wish she would in 
plain 
          terms tell all, for that‟s the way indeed. 
                                                                                           (IV.iii.185-9) 
For the Friar, to know is to be irrevocably tainted; for Vasques, though, knowledge is 
not a permanent enlightenment but a temporary acquisition, a process that is valued 
for its own sake rather than for what it represents.  It is interesting to plot Vasques‟ 
trajectory through the play in these terms.  Seeing through Hippolyta, suspecting 
Annabella, anticipating Giovanni, Vasques is „knowing‟ indeed, and his confidence in 
his own knowledge may well seem justified when he departs the play alive, 
unpunished, and with an exit line which expresses nothing but self-satisfaction: „‟Tis 
well; this conquest is mine, and I rejoice that a Spaniard outwent an Italian in revenge‟ 
(V.vi.146-7).  The Friar leaves in order that he may not know; Vasques stays until he 
is in full possession of all the facts, so that he shares with the audience the possession 
of narrative satisfaction at least, even if events have not unfolded entirely in 
accordance with his wishes. 
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A similarly functional attitude to knowledge is shared with Vasques by the man who 
pardons him, the Cardinal.  Unlike the Friar, the Cardinal is not at all hesitant to lay 
claim to authority on the basis of knowledge, though like the Friar, he does so largely 
in secular matters.  When Grimaldi is pursued to his door, there is an enactment of the 
pursuit of knowledge, too, to its borders.  Ignorance of a variety of things is the 
keystone of the Cardinal‟s counter-charges against Grimaldi‟s accusers: 
          Why, how now, friends!  What saucy mates are you 
          That know nor duty nor civility? 
          Are we a person fit to be your host, 
          Or is our house become your common inn, 
          To beat our doors at pleasure?  What such haste 
          Is yours as that it cannot wait fit times? 
          Are you the masters of this commonwealth, 
          And know no more discretion? 
                                           (III.ix.28-35) 
Passing on after this disabling preamble to the substance of their complaint, he is able 
to dismiss it slickly on the grounds of his own superior knowledge: 
                                   you have lost a nephew, 
          Donado, last night by Grimaldi slain: 
          Is that your business?  Well, sir, we have knowledge on‟t. 
          Let that suffice. 
                                           (III.ix.36-9) 
And he continues to harp on the theme when he warns them: 
                         know, as nuncio from the Pope, 
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          For this offence I here receive Grimaldi 
          Into his holiness‟ protection. 
                                             (III.ix.52-4) 
The ambiguity of the syntax here serves only too clearly to point up that it is the sub-
text rather than the text which is important: the abrupt imperative „know‟ is 
empowered by its immediate proximity to the declaration of the Cardinal‟s status as 
„nuncio from the Pope‟, while the initial placing of „For this offence‟ provocatively 
invites a reading in which Grimaldi is afforded protection because he has committed 
the offence, with the murder acting as positive stimulus for papal interest rather than 
merely rendering it necessary.  It is hardly surprising that the Cardinal should 
conclude his dismissal with the injunction „learn more wit, for shame‟ (III.ix.59): 
when „wit‟ - a part of the process of cognition itself - is seen as the object of 
„learning‟, rather than any specific piece of information, it becomes quite clear that, as 
in Vasques‟ epistemological model, what is important is not the subject of knowledge 
but the politics of its processes. 
 
 
A similar awareness imbues the comical exchange between Donado, Bergetto and 
Florio: 
          FLORIO: Sure ‟twas the doctor‟s niece, that was last day with us here. 
          BERGETTO: ‟Twas she, ‟twas she.          
          DONADO  How do you know that, simplicity? 
          BERGETTO                                                      Why, does not he say so?  If I 
                      should have said no, I should have given him the lie, uncle, and so have 
                      deserved a dry beating again; I‟ll none of that. 
19 
                                                                                 (II.vi.96-101) 
Bergetto may be simple, but he is wise enough to realise that what he needs to know is 
the social and political origin of any claim to knowledge rather than the veracity of its 
content.  Donado‟s oxymoronic coupling of knowledge and simplicity serves to 
reinforce our sense of the lack of wisdom that may be entailed in society‟s privileging 
of the status of the knower over the status of what is known, while Bergetto‟s blunt 
reference to a „dry beating‟ merely offers a simple statement of the power relations 
governing knowledge which are expressed so much more knowingly by the Cardinal.  
Moreover, the phrase „dry beating‟, not suggested by anything in the preceding 
dialogue, may well recall the phrase „dry basting‟, used by Dromio of Syracuse to his 
master during a long discussion of the whys, wherefores, rhymes and reasons of a 
beating which, as the audience know, was actually administered on the basis of a 
mistaken identity and as an apparently natural effect of the power-relation between the 
two.
29
   
 
 
The inescapability of politics is something which Ford himself underlines when he 
gives the Cardinal the closing speech of the play and allows that final summing-up to 
stand as his own title.  Although the greater part of the play has been concerned with 
the domestic affairs of Parma, the dramatist shows himself acutely aware that however 
peripheral the Cardinal may be to the events of the plot, his social position is enough 
to ensure that though his experiences may correlate only indirectly with those of the 
rest of the characters, the language in which he chooses to describe events will always 
be what passes for the normative and formative.  The Cardinal is also allowed to 
dispense justice on Putana,
30
 and chooses a punishment which seems to label her 
20 
crime as witchcraft when he decrees that she shall be burned to ashes.
31
  His 
epistemological counterpart Vasques, has, however, perhaps acted more judiciously 
when, on his own initiative, he inflicted on Putana the traditional mythological 
punishment for inappropriate and particularly sexual knowledge, the blinding which 
was the fate of Gloucester and the choice of Oedipus.
32
  Oedipus is a figure with 
whom Orgilus in The Broken Heart explicitly compares himself  - „Dark sentences are 
for Apollo‟s priests; / I am not Oedipus‟33 (an allusion picked up in the 1994-5 
Stratford-upon-Avon production by making Tecnicus blind) - and the connection here 
is made particularly potent in the terms of Vasques‟ instruction, „You shall know 
presently.  Come sirs, take me this old damnable hag, gag her instantly, and put out 
her eyes‟ (IV.iii.224-5).  With its obvious literal and symbolic links to the processes 
and politics of knowing, this literal disablement also bodies forth the symbolic 
disabling strategies which have punctuated the attempts of the Friar and the Cardinal 
to maintain control over knowledge, and thus serves to align the Cardinal with his 
religious confrere as well as with Vasques.  Such a doubling of doublings serves as a 
powerful emblem for the radical instability with which Ford has imbued his complex 
depictions of knowledge, its cognitive mechanisms, and its social meanings.  If we 
agree with Giovanni, we are forced to recognise that our own responses to the play 
must always be devalued because of our merely vicarious experience of it; if we agree 
with the Friar, we may well conclude that the very act of viewing the story has been an 
essentially corrupting one, and that vicarious experience, far from being insufficient, 
is therefore in itself too much.  Paradoxically, the perspective we are most likely to 
adopt is in fact that shared by the two characters whom we may well like the least, the 
Cardinal and Vasques, whose awareness of the uses of knowledge we are surely likely 
to share.  As our „discovery‟ of that initial allusion to Marlowe suggests, a play which 
21 
concentrates so much on dramatisation of the dangers of knowledge never ceases to 
remind us that we are always already implicated in it.
34
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